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THE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBAL RECOGNITION PROCESS
AND THE COURTS
Roberto Iraola∗

I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government’s recognition of an American Indian group
as a tribe enables the group to participate in federal assistance
programs,1 establishes a government-to-government relationship
between the United States and the tribe, and “imposes on the
government a fiduciary trust relationship to the tribe and its members.”2
∗ Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security at the
Department of the Interior. J.D. Catholic University Law School (1983). The views expressed
herein are solely those of the author and do not purport to reflect the views of the Department of the
Interior.
1. As noted by one commentator, “[f]ederal recognition automatically qualifies tribes as
eligible for multiple forms of federal assistance programs. Services such as financial assistance and
social services, loans to tribal members, housing improvement programs, and health services are
just a few of the many services and benefits provided to qualified, eligible Indian tribes.” R.
Spencer Clift, III., The Historical Development of American Indian Tribes; Their Recent Dramatic
Commercial Advancement; and Discussion of the Eligibility of Indian Tribes Under the Bankruptcy
Code and Related Matters, 27 AM. IND. L. REV. 177, 195 (2003) (footnotes omitted); Alva C.
Mather, Comment, Old Promises: The Judiciary and the Future of Native American Federal
Acknowledgement Litigation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1827, 1833 (2003) (“Arguably the most important
benefit associated with federal recognition is the Indian tribe’s eligibility for federal services.”). See
Federal Recognition for American Indian Tribes, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Barry T. Hill,
Director, Natural Resources and Environment Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs (Sept.
17, 2002) (“In fiscal year 2002, the Congress appropriated about $5 billion for programs and
funding almost exclusively for recognized tribes.”).
2. H.R. REP. NO. 103-781, at 2 (1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3768. See William
W. Quinn, Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: Authority, Judicial Interposition,
and 25 C.F.R. Section 83, 17 AM. IND. L. REV. 37, 38 (1992) (“The acknowledgment establishes a
special bilateral government-to-government relationship between the tribal goverment and the
United States. This status entitles the tribe to a variety of services and benefits, which are provided
exclusively to American Indian tribes.”); Jackie J. Kim, Comment, The Indian Federal Recognition
Administrative Procedures Act of 1995: A Congressional Solution to an Administrative Morass, 9
ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 899, 902 (1995) (“Federal recognition of an Indian tribe creates a formal
government-to-government relationship between the tribe and the United States. This recognition
guarantees benefits and services to Indian tribes by virtue of their status as tribes.”) (footnotes
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One important potential benefit from “quasi-government status” as a
result of recognition is the exemption from laws regulating gambling.3
Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988,4 a tribe is permitted
to operate casinos on lands that the government holds in trust if the state
where the tribe is located allows gaming and the tribe enters into a
compact with the state, which subsequently must be approved by the
Secretary of the Interior.5 The revenues from gaming operations have
proven to be an important source of funding for some tribal
governments.6
In 2004, tribal casinos nationwide generated
approximately $18.5 billion in revenues, twice the take of Nevada’s
omitted). In discussing tribal sovereignty, it is important to keep in mind that
Indian tribes pre-existed the federal Union and draw their powers from their original
status as sovereigns before European arrival. Indian tribal sovereignty is a retained
sovereignty, and includes all the powers of a sovereign that have not been divested by
Congress or by tribes’ incorporation into the Federal Union. As a result, tribal
sovereignty is not ‘conferred’ upon tribes through federal recognition. Rather,
recognition is a process by which the Federal Government acknowledges that particular
Indian entities retain their sovereign status.
Oversight Hearing on the Tribal Acknowledgment Process: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Tracy
Toulou, Director, Office of Tribal Justice), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
otj/testimony_feb_07_2002.htm [hereinafter Toulou Testimony].
3. GAO Report 02-49, Indian Issues: Improvements Needed in Tribal Recognition Process
(Nov. 2, 2001) at 1, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0249.pdf (“The quasi-sovereign
status created by this relationship exempts certain tribal lands from most state and local laws and
regulations – including, where applicable, laws regulating gambling.”) [hereinafter GAO Report 0249); Clift, supra note 1, at 195 (“As a sovereign entity, officially recognized tribes are allowed to
self govern and enjoy immunity from state taxation and regulations within tibal territory.
Recognition as a tribe is also a prerequisite to being exempt from state laws or state constitutional
provisions prohibiting casino gambling.”) (footnote omitted). See generally California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (holding that tribes had authority to establish
gambling operations on their reservations outside state regulation provided the state allowed
gambling). Quasi-government status also gives the recognized tribe additional powers including the
power to establish a separate judiciary and to tax, as well as immunity from suit. See Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (“Indian tribes have long been recognized as possessing
the common-law immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”); H.R. REP. NO.
103-781, at 2-3 (1994) reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3768 (“[Federal recognition]
institutionalizes the tribe’s quasi-sovereign status, along with all the powers accompanying that
status such as the power to tax, and to establish a separate judiciary.”) (footnotes omitted). See
generally Vicky J. Limas, Application of Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native
American Tribes: Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 681, 685-86
(1994) (discussing powers inherent in tribal self-government).
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2004), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (2004). See Rhode Island v.
Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685, 689-90 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing the Gaming Act).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2004).
6. See GAO Report 02-49, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that according to a report by the
National Gambling Impact Study Commission for the period 1995 through 1999, “of the 561
recognized tribes, only 193 tribes, or about 34 percent, actually participate[d] in gambling and only
27 tribes (or about 5 percent) generate[d] more than $100 million on an annual basis.”)
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casinos and more revenue than Mariott Hotels, A.G. Edwards and
Starbucks combined.7
Since 1978, the tribal recognition process principally has been
governed through regulations promulgated by the Department of the
Interior (the “Department” or “DOI”).8
Under the “federal
acknowledgement process,” 9 regulations set forth the standard of
evidence, burden of proof, criteria, and administrative procedures the
executive branch of government utilizes in ascertaining whether a group
is an Indian tribe.10 This article, which is divided into three parts,
examines the regulations and the judicial gloss placed on them by the
courts. First, and by way of background, the article discusses how tribes
historically were recognized. The article then reviews in detail the 1978
regulations as promulgated and amended. Lastly, the article discusses
how courts have responded to challenges to, and interpreted various
aspects of, these regulations.

7. Electa Draper, Indian Gaming’s Future Eyed, DENVER POST, March 30, 2005, available
at http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~53~2788770,00.html (last accessed Apr. 8, 2005)
(“[The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act] resulted in an Indian gambling industry in which more than
220 tribes in 28 states pulled in $18.5 billion last year, about twice the take of Las Vegas casinos.”).
Jodi Rave, Governors, Tribes Talk Gaming, BILLINGS GAZETTE, March 30, 2005, available at
http://www.billingsgazette.com/index.php?id=1&display=rednews/2005/03/30/build/state/45-tribegambling.inc (last accessed Apr. 8, 2005) (“Last year, tribal governments’ gross revenues from
casinos topped $18.5 billion more revenue than Starbucks, A.G. Edwards and Mariott Hotels
combined.”).
8. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe,
25 C.F.R. §§ 83.1 – 83.13 (2004). As explained more fully below, a tribe seeking federal
recognition is not limited to the administrative process. It may seek recognition directly from
Congress. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1097 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (“Although Congress has recognized tribes through legislation in recent years, it is
ordinarily up to the Secretary of the Interior, through a painstaking bureaucratic process, to
determine whether the United States will recognize the sovereignty of a putative tribe.”); Emma
Schwartz, Virginia Tribes Fight for Sovereignty, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004 at A12 (reporting on
progress of six Virginia Indian tribes seeking to gain federal recognition from Congress before the
400th anniversary of Jamestown’s founding); Peter Hardin, Senate May Vote on Recognizing 6
Tribes, TIMES-DISPATCH, May 9, 2004, at B1 available at http://www.timesdispatch.com.
9. See Kim, supra note 2, at 899 (referring to program as the “federal acknowledgment
process” or “FAP”) (footnote omitted); Rachael Paschal, Comment, The Imprimatur of Recognition:
American Indian Tribes and the Federal Acknowledgement Process, 66 WASH. L. REV. 209 (1991);
Mather, supra note 1, at 1838 (same).
10. See Barbara N. Coen, The Role of Jurisdiction in the Quest for Sovereignty: Tribal Status
Decision Making: A Federal Perspective on Acknowledgment, 37 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 491, 491
(2003) (“These regulations delineate the criteria, standard of evidence, burden of proof, and
administrative procedures for federal acknowledgment utilized in determining whether a particular
group is an Indian tribe.”); Quinn, supra note 2, at 40-41 (“It was not until the promulgation of the
acknowledgment regulations in 1978 . . . that a systematic, uniform method for Indian groups to
attain federal acknowledgment as Indian tribes was established.”).
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II. FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF INDIAN TRIBES – AN OVERVIEW
The dominant role of Congress with respect to questions
concerning a tribe’s sovereignty and title to land is derived from its
power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,”11 to
“dispose of . . . Property belonging to the United States,”12 and to
provide advice and consent in the formulation of treaties.13 While
Congress has delegated the power to recognize tribes to the executive
branch,14 it also has been argued that the executive branch, independent
of the power delegated by Congress, has inherent power over Indian
matters.15
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.; see FELIX S. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
3 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.) (“Historically, the federal government has determined
that certain groups of Indians will be recognized as tribes for various purposes. Such
determinations are incident to the Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution, which expressly
grants Congress power ‘[t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.’”) (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW].
12. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2; see HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at
209 (“The power of Congress under the Property Clause to dispose of and regulate ‘the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States’ has been considered an additional source of authority
over Indian affairs”) (footnotes omitted).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties[.]”); see John W. Ragsdale, The United Tribe of
Shawnee Indians: The Battle for Recognition, 69 UMKC L. REV. 311, 320 (2000) (“The paramount
role of Congress stems from its constitutionally delegated control over federal property, its advisory
role in the formulation of treaties, and its power ‘to regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
tribes . . . .’”) (footnotes omitted); L.R. Weatherhead, What Is An “Indian Tribe”? – The Question
of Tribal Existence, 8 AM. IND. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980) ( “The powers over Indians conferred by the
United States Constitution on the federal government spring principally from the treaty power and
the commerce clause.”) (footnotes omited); Clift, supra note 1, at 184 (discussing Treaty Power and
commerce clause).
14. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 255 F.3d
342, 345 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002) (“[T]he general view nowadays . . . is
that Congress has the power, both directly and by delegation to the President, to establish criteria for
recognizing a tribe.”). See also Quinn, supra note 2, at 47-53 (discussing delegation under 5 U.S.C.
§ 301 and 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9); Clift, supra note 1, at 188 (“Congress has delegated regulation over
tribes – although some consider the duty a nondelegable, constitutionally empowered responsibility
– to the executive branch (i.e., the [Bureau of Indian Affairs].”).
15. See Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States, 13 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 271, 272 (2001) (“In theory, the President could unilaterally recognize a tribe by
taking action consistent with recognizing a foreign government, such as making a proclamation of
recognition, establishing regular dealings with the tribe, or applying existing law to the tribe. Power
to undertake certain diplomatic and administrative actions consistent with federal recognition of
tribes is constitutionally and statutorily committed to the executive branch.”). One commentator
maintains:
Despite the legislature’s general preeminence in Indian affairs under the so-called Indian
Commerce Clause, the federal government’s Indian authority is not wholly monopolized
by Congress. Rather, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty and the government-togovernment character of federal relations with Indian tribes – principles that necessarily
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Historically, Indian tribes were granted recognition by the federal
government through treaties.16 In 1871, this practice ceased17 and
executive orders18 and legislation19 generally became the vehicles
through which government recognition policy with respect to Indians
was effected.20 Following the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act
underpin the entire corpus of Indian affairs jurisprudence – suggest also an important
role for the executive branch, particularly with respect to matters of tribal recognition.
Despite the seeming assumption by generations of courts and commentators that federal
power over Indian affairs is left entirely in the hands of Congress, there also exists an
important independent presidential power. That is, the fundamentally political nature of
the federal-Indian relationship implicates the same constitutionally-given executive
power involved in the recognition of sovereign governments in foreign relations.
Christopher A. Ford, Executive Prerogatives in Federal Indian Jurisprudence: The Constitutional
Law of Tribal Recognition, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 141, 143 (1995). But see Ragsdale, supra note
13, at 321 (2000) (“The Supreme Court has never confirmed th[is] power[], however, and the
executive role in the recognition of Indian tribes . . . has been carried out within the parameters of
congressional delegation or acquiescence.”) Perhaps, the best that can be said on this issue is that
“the analogy to recognition of foreign governments has prevailed to the extent that Congress has
delegated to the executive branch the power of recognition of Indian tribes without setting forth any
criteria to guide the exercise of that power.” Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc., 255 F.3d at
345.
16. See Mather, supra note 1, at 1831 (“Historically, treaty negotiations were the ‘accepted
method’ for establishing a legal relationship between an Indian tribe and the United States
goverment.”) (footnote omitted).
17. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 41st Cong. ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1870) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
71 (2004)). In Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51 (2d. Cir. 1994), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed:
Numerous reasons were advanced for termination of Indian policy based on treaty
negotiations. After the War of 1812 the military importance of alliances with Indian
tribes was diminished. The movement to end treaty making gained strength as a result of
alliances between some of the southern Indian tribes and the Confederacy. The final
decision to end treaty making resulted from a movement by members of the House of
Representatives to equalize power between that body and the Senate through the removal
of Indian relations from the treaty-making process.
Id. at 57.
18. See Sharon O’Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a
Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1472 (1991) (discussing how after Congress passed
legislation ending treaty-making with Indian nations, for several decades, some “tribes received
executive order reservations”). In 1919, Congress abolished the practice of establishing
reservations through executive order. See Appropriations - Indian Department, Hastings
Amendment, ch. 4, 41 Stat. 3 (1919) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 450 (2004)).
19. In the legislative context, “acknowledgement” must be distinguished from “restoration.”
As one commentator explains, during the 1950s, “Congress terminated the government-togovernment relationship of several Indian tribes. The termination policy subsequently failed. The
tribes once terminated have gradually been ‘restored’ to their former legal statuses as federally
acknowledged via congressional legislation, since the executive is precluded from acknowledging a
congressionally terminated tribe.” Quinn, supra note 2, at 42 n.21 (citations omitted). See, e.g.,
Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Restoration Act of 1980, H.R. 4996, 96th Cong. (1980) (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (2004)).
20. See Henry Sockbeson, Reflections on a Flawed System, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 483, 485
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of 1934,21 the Department became more involved in recognition
determinations because benefits created by the Act flowed only to
descendants of recognized Indian tribes.22
Before the 1960s, the Department was able to assess each
recognition request on an individual basis without any need for formal
guidelines.23 Then, in the 1970s, a series of cases brought by Indian
groups seeking to enforce trust obligations and treaty rights,24 and a
report to Congress by the American Indian Policy Review Commission
that criticized the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”)--in part for its
inconsistent treatment of Indian groups--resulted in an increase in the
number of requests.25 This led to the promulgation of regulations
(2003) (“Subsequent to the treaty period, which ended in 1871, and until the adoption of federal
recognition regulations, the federal goverment made recognition decisions through legislation,
basically on an ad hoc basis. As problems arose, they were resolved through legislation, or the
President issued executive orders.”); Kim, supra note 2, at 905 (“Before the BIA implemented the
FAP and its criteria, the United States relied on treaties, executive orders, legislation, and court
decisions to determine whether a particular Indian group qualified for federal recognition as an
Indian tribe.”) (footnotes omitted). See generally Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195,
1202 (10th Cir. 2002) (“The federal government has formally recognized the rights of Indians to
specified areas of land through treaties with tribes and by statute and executive order.”). With
respect to court decisions, one commentator points out:
It is more exact . . . to say that courts can confirm a recognition after examining the
treaties, statutes and executive orders to determine whether or not a political relationship
has been established and maintained. Congress itself has stated that court decision can
be the basis for recognition, but this is likely an observation of the court’s interpretative
powers rather than a concession that the judiciary has an independent power to establish
political relationships for the federal government.
Ragsdale, supra note 13, at 322-23 (footnotes omitted). See also Kim, supra note 2, at 905
(clarifying the observation made by some that tribal recognition can come about as a result of court
decision). See generally Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(“Whether a group constitutes a ‘tribe’ is a matter that is ordinarily committed to the discretion of
Congress and the Executive Branch, and courts will defer to their judgment.”); HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 11, at 3 (“For most current purposes, judicial deference to
findings of tribal existence is still mandated by the extensive nature of congressional power in the
field.”)
21. 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-494 (2004)); see Mather, supra note 1,
at 1830-31 (discussing the purpose of the Act).
22. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, 39 F.3d at 57 (“After passage of the Indian
Reorganization Act recognition proceedings were necessary because the benefits created by it were
made available only to descendants of ‘recognized’ Indian tribes.”).
23. See GAO Report 02-49, supra note 3, at 3 (“Until the 1960s, the limited number of
requests by groups to be federally recognized permitted the Department to assess a group’s status on
a case-by-case basis without formal guidelines.”).
24. See Sockbeson, supra note 20, at 487-489 (discussing key cases); Paschal, supra note 9, at
210-11 (same).
25. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe,
43 Fed. Reg. 39, 361 (Sept. 5, 1978) (noting how an increase in the number of requests for
acknowledgment in the 1970s “necessitate[d] the development of procedures to enable the
Department to take a uniform approach in their evaluation.”).
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establishing policies and procedures to govern the acknowledgment of
Indian tribes in 1978.26 These regulations, presently codified at 25
C.F.R. §§ 83.1 – 83.13,27 are discussed in detail below.28
III. THE REGULATORY PROCESS
The Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (the “Assistant
Secretary”) is responsible for promoting self-determination on behalf of
the 562 federally recognized tribes and fulfilling the Department’s trust
responsibilities.29 He also oversees the Bureau of Indian Affairs, an
26. See Kim, supra note 2, at 906 (identifying two main factors that led to promulgation of
regulations as report by American Indian Policy Review Commission and cases involving treaty
rights and trust obligations); Dan Gunter, The Technology of Tribalism: The Lemhi Indians, Federal
Recognition, and the Creation of Tribal Identity, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 85, 95 (1998) (same).
27. Originally codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 54, see 43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (Sept. 5, 1978), the
regulations were renumbered in 1982 at 25 C.F.R. Part 83. See Coen, supra note 10, at 491 n.2. In
1994, the regulations were amended. See Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian
Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 59 Fed. Reg. 9280, 9280-9300 (Feb. 25, 1994). The changes
entailed clarifying the requirements for acknowledgment and standards of evidence, reducing the
burden of proof for those groups which could demonstrate prior Federal acknowledgment, providing
independent review of decisions, revising timeframes for actions, providing an opportunity for a
formal hearing, and defining access to records. Id. at 9280
28. The Department also promulgated guidelines to the regulations which are available to the
public. See The Official Guidelines to the Federal Acknowledgment Regulations, 25 C.F.R. § 83
(Dept. 1997) [hereinafter Guidelines]. The regulations were promulgated in part under the general
statutory authority found in 25 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) (“The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under
the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may
prescribe, have the management of all Indian Affairs and of all matters arising out of Indian
relations.”); 25 U.S.C. § 9 (2004) (“The President may prescribe such regulations as he may think
fit for carrying into effect the various provisions of any act relating to Indian affairs, and for
settlement of the accounts of Indian affairs.”); and 43 U.S.C. § 1457 (2004) (“The Secretary of the
Interior is charged with the supervision of public business relating to the following subjects and
agencies: . . . 10. Indians.”). The regulations were the result of extensive consultation, discussion
and comment. As reflected in the preamble, the input consisted of:
400 meetings, discussions and conversations about Federal acknowledgment with other
Federal agencies, State government officials, tribal representatives, petitioners,
congressional staff members, and legal representatives of petitioning groups; 60 written
comments on the initial proposed regulations on June 16, 1977; a national conference on
Federal acknowledgment attended by approximately 350 representatives of Indian tribes
and organizations; and 34 comments on the revised proposed regulations, published on
June 1, 1978.
43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (Sept. 5, 1978).
29. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Interior, Martin Issues Final Determination to
Decline Federal Acknowledgement of the Snohomish Tribe of Indians (Dec. 2, 2003) [hereinafter
Snohomish Tribe Press Release], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/031202a.htm. Under the
regulations, the Department must periodically publish a list of all federally acknowledged tribes in
the Federal Register. 25 C.F.R. § 83.5(a) (2004). While the regulations require that the list be
published at least every three years, id., under the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-454, §104, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 479a-1 (2004)),
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agency of approximately 10,500 employees that provides services to
close to 1.4 million Alaska Natives and American Indians from federally
recognized tribes, and the Office of Federal Acknowledgement (“OFA”),
which administers the federal acknowledgement process.30 The OFA
directly reports to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs31 and is staffed by three anthropologists, three historians, three
genealogists, a secretary, and a director.32
A. Standing
The regulations provide that only “American Indian groups33
indigenous to the continental United States34 which are not currently
acknowledged as Indian tribes by the Department” may petition for
recognition.35 Organizations, corporations, associations, or recently
formed groups may not be acknowledged.36 Similarly, political factions,
the list must be published annually.
30. See Snohomish Tribe Press Release, supra note 29; Interior Department Tribal
Recognition Process, Hearing Before Comm. on House Government Reform, 108th Cong. (2004)
(statement of Theresa Rosier, Counselor to the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs) (“The Federal
acknowledgement process is implemented by the Office of Federal Acknowledgment . . . formerly
the Branch of Acknowledgement and Research.”) [hereinafter Rosier Testimony].
31. See Rosier Testimony, supra note 30 (“Previously, the Branch of Acknowledgement and
Research reported through the Office of Tribal Services and the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the
Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs. This realignment eliminated two layers of review and now
provides more direct and efficient policy guidance.”). The regulations generally refer to the
“Assistant Secretary” as the final decision maker. They define Assistant Secretary as “the Assistant
Secretary – Indian Affairs, or that officer’s authorized representative.” By order of the Secretary of
the Interior dated April 9, 2004, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs was
delegated the authority to “perform all . . . duties relating to the federal recognition of Native
American tribes, taking land into trust for gaming purposes, and other gaming maters.” Secretarial
Order No. 3252, Authorities Delegated to the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary – Indian Affairs
(Apr. 9, 2004) available at http://elips.doi.gov/elips/sec_orders/html_orders/3252.htm.
32. Rosier Testimony, supra note 30 (“OFA is staffed with a director, a secretary, three
anthropologists, three genealogists, and three historians.”).
33. The regulations define an “Indian group” or “group” as “any Indian or Alaska Native
aggregation within the continental United States that the Secretary of the Interior does not
acknowledge to be a tribe.” 25 C.F.R. § 83.1 (2004).
34. The regulations define “continental United States” as the “contiguous 48 states and
Alaska.” Id. Native Hawaiians groups are not covered by the regulations. See Kahawaiolaa v.
Norton, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1221 (D. Haw. 2002) (dismissing action by Native Hawaiian seeking
recognition as tribe under the regulations finding they did not facially apply and that the issue of
recognition presented “a political question inappropriate for judicial review”).
35. 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(a) (2004). Thus, “Indian tribes, organized bands, pueblos, Alaska Native
villages, or communities which are already acknowledged as such and are receiving services from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs may not be reviewed under the procedures established by [the]
regulations.” Id. § 83.3(b).
36. Id. § 83.3(c). If a group meets the criteria for recognition, its decision to incorporate will
have no bearing on the final decision reached by the Assistant Secretary. Id.
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splinter groups, or any other groups that separate from the body of an
acknowledged tribe,37 or groups subject to legislation forbidding or
terminating recognition as a tribe, may not be acknowledged.38 Finally,
groups whose petitions have been previously denied may not avail
themselves of the administrative acknowledgement process.39
B. Letter of Intent, Petition, and Notice
The recognition process starts with an Indian group filing a letter of
intent requesting acknowledgement, signed by the group’s governing
body, with the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs (the “Assistant
Secretary”).40 At the same time or later, the group must also submit a
documented petition signed by the group’s governing body setting forth
why it meets the seven criteria that are required for recognition.41 The
Assistant Secretary has thirty days to acknowledge receipt of the letter or
the documented petition (if no letter of intent was ever served), and sixty
days to publish notice of the letter of intent or petition in the Federal
Register and a major newspaper or newspapers of general circulation in
the city or town nearest the petitioner.42 The Assistant Secretary also
37. Id. § 83.3(d).
38. Id. § 83.3(e). See United Auburn Indian Community, 24 I.B.I.A. 33 (1993) (ruling that
Department of the Interior lacked the administrative authority to restore recognition of Indian tribe
that was lawfully terminated pursuant to legislation).
39. 25 C.F.R. § 83.3(g)
40. Id. § 83.4.
41. Id. §§ 83.4(b), 83.6(a)-(c). The seven criteria are discussed in detail below. See infra
notes 45-57 and accompanying text. After submitting a letter of intent, a group has “unlimited time
under the regulations in which to prepare and submit a documented petition.” See Guidelines, supra
note 28, at 8.
42. 25 C.F.R. §§ 83.9(a), (c). The notice, which provides background information (i.e., name,
location, and mailing address) about the petitioner, is designed in part to provide an “opportunity for
interested parties and informed parties to submit factual or legal arguments in support of or in
opposition to the petitioner’s request for acknowledgement and/or request to be kept informed of all
general actions affecting the petition.” Id. § 83.9(a). An “interested party” is “any person,
organization or other entity who can establish legal, factual or property interest in an
acknowledgement determination and who requests an opportunity to submit comments or evidence
or to be kept informed of general actions regarding a specific petitioner.” Id. § 83.1. It includes the
governor and attorney general of petitioner’s state, and may include local government units and
unrecognized or recognized Indian groups that may be affected by the determination. Id. See In re
Federal Acknowledgment of the Snoqualmie Tribal Organization, 34 I.B.I.A. 22 (1999) (stating that
the definition of interested party under the regulation reflects “an intent to broaden the scope of
those entitled to participate in the Departmental acknowledgement proceedings beyond the range of
those entitled to intervene in Federal court proceeding under FED. R. CIV. PROC. 24, at least with
respect to local governmental units, recognized Indian tribes, and unrecognized Indian groups”); In
re Federal Acknowledgment of the Match-e-be-nash-she-wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians of
Michigan, 33 I.B.I.A. 291 (1999) (ruling that interested party status is not restricted to local
government units in the immediate vicinity of the group seeking acknowledgement and that such
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must notify, in writing, the governor and the attorney general of the state
where the petitioner is located,43 as well as any recognized tribe or other
petitioning tribe that “appears to have a historical or present relationship
with the petitioner or which may otherwise be considered to have a
potential interest in the acknowledgement determination.”44
C. The Contents of the Petition and Level of Proof
For a group seeking tribal recognition to succeed, it must satisfy
seven criteria.45 Specifically, the group must demonstrate that: (i) it “has
been identified as an American Indian entity on a substantially
continuous basis since 1900;”46 (ii) a predominant portion of it
“comprises a distinct community and has existed as a historical
community from historical times until the present;”47 (iii) it “has
maintained political influence or authority over its members as an
autonomous entity from historical times until the present;”48 (iv) it has

party may file a request for reconsideration of a final decision before the Board even if it did not
participate in the original proceedings before the Assistant Secretary). An “informed party” is a
person or entity other than an interested party “who requests an opportunity to submit comments or
evidence or to be kept informed of general actions regarding a specific petitioner.” 25 C.F.R. §
83.1.
43. 25 C.F.R. § 83.9(b). As noted previously, the governor and attorney general of a
petitioner’s state are considered “interested parties.” Id. § 83.1.
44. Id. § 83.9(b).
45. Id. § 83.6(c). The regulations provide that a petition “must include thorough explanations
and supporting documentation in response to all of the criteria” and that the “criteria should be read
carefully” taking into account the regulations’ definitions. Id.
46. Id. § 83.7(a). In determining a group’s Indian identity, factors to consider include:
(1) Identification as an Indian entity by Federal authorities.
(2) Relationships with State governments based on identification of the group as Indian.
(3) Dealings with a county, parish, or other local government in a relationship based on
the group’s Indian identity.
(4) Identification as an Indian entity by anthropologists, historians, and/or other scholars.
(5) Identification as an Indian entity in newspapers and books.
(6) Identification as an Indian entity in relationships with Indian tribes or with national,
regional, or state Indian organizations.
Id.
47. Id. § 83.7(b). The regulations define community as “any group of people which can
demonstrate that consistent interactions and significant social relationships exist within its
membership and that its members are differentiated from and identified as distinct from
nonmembers.” Id. § 83.1. They also provide guidance on the type of evidence needed to establish
this criterion. Id. § 83.7(b)(1)-(2). See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d
742, 747-48 (N.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The Department reads the
regulations as requiring that the petitioning tribe’s members meet and interact, that the petitioning
tribe’s members be seen as American Indian, and that the petitioning tribe be a dynamic group
rather than simply many people with common Indian ancestors.”).
48. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(c).
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submitted a copy of its “present governing documents including its
membership criteria;”49 (v) its “membership consists of individuals who
descend from a historical Indian tribe or from historical Indian tribes
which combined and functioned as a single autonomous political
entity;”50 (vi) the group’s membership “is composed principally of
persons who are not members of any acknowledged North American
Indian tribe;”51 and (vii) neither the group nor its members “are the
subject of congressional legislation that has expressly terminated or
forbidden the Federal relationship.”52
Conclusive proof is not required to establish any of the seven
criteria.53 Rather, a criterion will be met “if the available evidence
establishes a reasonable likelihood of the validity of the facts relating to
that criterion.”54 Furthermore, while the regulations provide guidance on
the type of evidence a group may want to rely upon to establish certain
of the criteria,55 such evidence is not mandatory.56 A group may
establish any of those criteria by suitable evidence that demonstrates the
requirements of the criterion at issue, which includes its related

49. Id. § 83.7(d).
50. Id. § 83.7(e). The types of evidence that may be used to satisfy this criterion are set forth
in subsections (e)(1)(i) through (e)(1)(v). See Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Babbitt, No. 982136, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14479, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 30, 2000) (“The works of
anthropologists, historians and other scholars, as well as newspapers and books, are acceptable to
satisfy the identification requirement of criterion (a), but records are required to satisfy criterion
(e).”). The group must provide an official list of its members certified by the group’s governing
body, as well as a list of the group’s former members based on the group’s criteria. 25 C.F.R. §
83.7(e)(2).
51. 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(f). Even if the membership of the group is comprised of persons who
have been associated with, or appeared on the rolls of, an acknowledged Indian tribe, the group may
still meet this criterion if “it has functioned throughout history until the present as a separate
autonomous Indian tribal entity, . . . its members do not maintain a bilateral political relationship
with the acknowledged tribe, and . . . its members have provided written confirmation of their
membership in the petitioning group.” Id.
52. Id. § 83.7(g).
53. Id. § 83.6(d).
54. Id.
In rejecting preponderance of the evidence as the applicable standard in
acknowledgment decisions, the Department noted during its revision of the regulations in 1994:
‘Preponderance’ is a legal standard focused on weighing evidence for versus against a
position. It is not appropriate for the present circumstances where the primary question
is usually whether the level of evidence is high enough, even in the absence of negative
evidence, to demonstrate meeting a criterion, for example, showing that political
authority has been exercised.
Procedures for Establishing that an American Indian Group Exists as an Indian Tribe, 59 Fed. Reg.
9280 (Feb. 25, 1994).
55. See, e.g., 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(a)-(c).
56. Id. § 83.6(g).
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definitions.57
D. Previously Acknowledged Groups
If a group can provide substantial evidence of prior federal
acknowledgement,58 its burden is lessened in the following manner.59
First, it need demonstrate that it has been identified as an American
Indian entity only “since the point of last Federal acknowledgement.”60
Second, the group does not need to demonstrate that it existed as a
distinct community historically, only that it presently comprises a
distinct community.61 Lastly, the group need only show present political
influence or authority over its members.62 The group also must meet the
requirements of the remaining four criteria.63
E. Preliminary Review
Upon receipt of a documented petition, OFA conducts a
“preliminary review of the petition for purposes of technical
assistance.”64 The purpose of this review is to identify deficiencies or
important omissions in the petition and provide the group with an
opportunity to withdraw the petition or address the deficiencies and/or

57. Id. The definitions provided in § 83.1 “are an integral part of the regulations, and the
criteria should be read carefully with these definitions.” Id. § 83.6(c).
58. The regulations define “previous federal acknowledgement” as “any action by the Federal
government clearly premised on identification of a tribal political entity and indicating clearly the
recognition of a relationship between that entity and the United States.” 25 C.F.R. § 83.1. Such
acknowledgement may be established by:
(1) Evidence that the group has had treaty relations with the United States.
(2) Evidence that the group has been denominated a tribe by act of Congress or
Executive Order.
(3) Evidence that the group has been treated by the Federal Government as having
collective rights in tribal lands or funds.
Id. § 83.8(c)(1)-(3).
59. Id. § 83.8(a).
60. Id. § 83.8(d)(1). The group also “must have been identified by such sources as the same
tribal entity that was previously acknowledged or as a portion that has evolved from that entity.” Id.
61. Id. § 83.8(d)(2).
62. Id. § 83.8(d)(3).
63. Id. § 83.8(d)(4). One commentator maintains that the Department’s promulgative
authority over tribes whose existence had been acknowledged by Congress, the executive, or the
courts prior to the regulations is open to question. See Ragsdale, supra note 13, at 338 (“It is one
thing to find implicit authority in the BIA to promulgate regulations and adjudicate with respect to
previously unacknowledged tribes; it is quite another to find implicit power in an agency to
unilaterally terminate a formally-established, nation-to-nation relationship, to abrogate treaties or to
counter Supreme Court opinions.”).
64. 25 C.F.R. § 83.10(b) (2004).
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omissions.65 If the petition contains evidence of, or claims previous
federal acknowledgement, OFA determines whether the evidence is
sufficient to trigger the lesser standard that is applicable to previously
acknowledged groups.66
OFA also must investigate any petition which, together with a
response to deficiencies identified during the technical review, possesses
little or no evidence of the last three of the seven criteria needed for
acknowledgment.67 If the evidence presented “clearly establishes” that
the group does not meet either of these three criteria, then it is not
necessary to consider the petition under the remaining criteria.68 If, on
the other hand, the review does not clearly demonstrate that the group
does not meet one or more of the last three mandatory criteria, then a full
evaluation of the petition under all seven criteria must be undertaken.69
F. Active Consideration and Proposed Findings
After the deficiencies and/or omissions in the preliminary review
are addressed, the petition is placed in active consideration.70 The group
and interested parties are notified of this action and provided with the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of OFA staff involved.71 If
there has been any substantive comment filed in connection with the
petition prior to it being placed on active consideration or during the
preparation of the proposed finding, the petitioning group must be given
an opportunity to respond to such comments.72
Within one year after notifying the petitioning group that its
petition was placed in active consideration, the Assistant Secretary must

65. Id. § 83.10(b)(1)-(2). During this process, if a group submits materials in response to a
deficiency identified during the technical review of the petition, additional review of those materials
will be undertaken only if the group requests it. Id. § 83.10(c)(1).
66. Id. § 83.10(b)(3); see supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text. If the technical review
process results in a request for additional evidence before a determination is made with respect to
prior federal acknowledgment and the group declines to provide it, then its petition will be treated as
one which does not claim prior federal acknowledgement. Id. § 83.10(c)(2).
67. Id. § 83.10(e); see supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
68. 25 C.F.R. § 83.10(e)(1) (2004). In this case, the group is denied acknowledgement and a
finding to that effect is published in the Federal Register. Id. The period for receipt of comments to
the proposed findings and the publication of a final determination are discussed in Section G below.
69. Id. § 83.10(e)(2).
70. The date the group is advised that the petition has been placed on active consideration
determines the order in which petitions are considered. Id. § 83.10(d). When two or more
documented petitions are found ready for active consideration on the same date, the register of
incomplete petitions or of letters of intent determines the order of consideration. Id.
71. Id. § 83.10(f)(1).
72. Id. § 83.10(f)(2).
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publish proposed findings in the Federal Register.73 This period may be
extended an additional 180 days at the Assistant Secretary’s discretion.74
The proposed findings must be accompanied by a report which
summarizes the evidence and sets forth the reasoning and analyses used
in arriving at the proposed findings.75 Copies of this report must be
provided to the petitioning group and interested and informed parties,
and also be available to others, if requested in writing.76
G. Response and Consultation
After publication of the proposed findings, the petitioning group or
any organization or individual wishing to support or challenge those
findings has 180 days to submit comments and evidence.77 Upon a
finding of “good cause,” the comment period may be extended an
additional 180 days.78
During the response period (and to the extent permissible by law),
the Assistant Secretary shall make available to the petitioning group any
records used in the proposed finding which the group does not already
have.79 Also, if requested by the group or an interested party, the
Assistant Secretary must hold an on-the-record meeting addressing the
analyses, reasoning, and factual support for the proposed finding.80 At
the conclusion of the comment period, the Assistant Secretary must
consult with the petitioning group and any interested parties to determine
a schedule for the consideration of the evidence and comments
submitted.81
H. Final Determination and Reconsideration
Within sixty days of the date of consideration of the comments and
evidence, the Assistant Secretary must publish a final determination in
the Federal Register.82 This determination becomes final ninety days
73. Id. § 83.10(h).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. § 83.10(i).
78. Id. Any informed or interested parties who submit comments or evidence must provide
the petitioning group with copies of their submissions. Id. A petitioning group has at least sixty
days to respond to any submissions by informed or interested parties. Id. § 83.10(k). This period
may be extended at the discretion of the Assistant Secretary. Id.
79. Id. § 83.10(j)(1).
80. Id. § 83.10(j)(2).
81. Id. § 83.10(l).
82. Id. § 83.10(l)(2). This period may be extended “if warranted by the extent and nature of
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after publication, unless a group or interested party files a request for
reconsideration with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (the
“Board”).83
The Board has the authority to consider a timely request for
reconsideration that alleges new evidence,84 challenges as unreliable a
substantial portion of the evidence relied upon in the final determination,
questions the interpretation of the evidence, or challenges as inadequate
or incomplete the research associated with the petition.85 The Board
may order a hearing before an administrative law judge if it finds that
there are genuine issues of material fact that need to be resolved, or the
record before it augmented.86 If the petitioning group or interested party
fails to establish any one of the grounds identified above by a
preponderance of the evidence, the Board must affirm the decision of the
Assistant Secretary.87 If the Board affirms the decision but determines
that the alleged grounds for reconsideration went beyond the four criteria
described above, it must send the request for reconsideration to the
Secretary of the Interior.88 The Secretary has the discretion to ask the
evidence and arguments received during the response period.” Id. § 83.10(l)(3).
83. Id. §§ 83.10(l)(4) & 83.11(a)(1)-(2). If the Assistant Secretary concludes that the
petitioning group does not satisfy the governing criteria, and therefore, federal acknowledgement is
not warranted, he must advise the group of alternatives to achieving Indian tribe status or through
which its members may become members of an acknowledged tribe or eligible for benefits from the
Department. Id. § 83.10(n). The Board has ruled consistently that the acknowledgement
regulations are binding on the Department when presented with the question of which Indian
entities should be considered “Indian tribes” under regulations and statutes which do not define the
term. See Edwards, McCoy & Kennedy and Western Shoshone Business Council of the Duck
Valley Reservation, 18 I.B.I.A. 454 (1990); Northwest Computer Supply, 16 I.B.I.A. 125 (1988).
84. In In re Federal Acknowledgment of the Match-e-be-nash-she-wish Band of Pottawatomi
Indians of Michigan, 33 I.B.I.A. 291 (1999), the Board ruled that documents which are alleged to
represent new evidence must be so labeled and that where the Board cannot ascertain, “with
reasonable diligence, what evidence is claimed to be new,” a request for reconsideration on that
ground will be rejected. See also In re Federal Acknowledgment of the Golden Hill Paugussett
Tribe, 32 I.B.I.A. 216 (1998) (“[T]he term ‘new evidence’ as that term is used in 25 C.F.R. Section
83.11(d)(1), includes only evidence that was not before the Assistant Secretary when she issued her
Final Determination.”).
85. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(d)(1)-(4) (2004); see In re Federal Acknowledgment of the MobileWashington County Band of Choctaw Indians of South Alabama, 34 I.B.I.A. 63 (1999) (“[I]n order
for a petitioner to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its research was inadequate or
incomplete in some material respect, it must show, at a minimum, that additional research would
produce material information not previously considered by the BIA.”)
86. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(e)(4).
87. Id. §§ 83.11(e)(9) & (10). If the interested party or petitioning group establishes one or
more of the grounds identified above by a preponderance of the evidence, then the Board must
vacate the Assistant Secretary’s determination and remand the case for further consideration. Id. §
83.11(e)(10).
88. Id. § 83.11(f)(2). Section 83.11(f) has been interpreted to allow the Board to refer to the
Secretary issues for clarification that “might not rise to the level of ‘grounds for reconsideration.’
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Assistant Secretary to reconsider the final determination on those
grounds.89 If he declines, the Assistant Secretary’s determination
becomes final.90 If the Secretary asks the Assistant Secretary to
reconsider, then the Assistant Secretary has 120 days to issue his
reconsidered determination, which becomes final upon notice of
publication in the Federal Register.91
As of July 2004, OFA had received 213 letters of intent from tribal
groups seeking recognition and sixty-nine incomplete petitions.92 Six
petitions were on active consideration, and an additional thirteen
completed petitions were awaiting consideration.93
Three final
determinations were under review by the Board following requests for
reconsideration. 94
IV. THE CASE LAW
If the petitioning group is recognized as a tribe, it becomes “eligible
for the services and benefits that . . . are available to other federally
recognized tribes” and also “to the privileges and immunities available
to other federally recognized historic tribes by virtue of their
government-to-government relationship with the United States.”95 But
what if the group is denied recognition as an Indian tribe? Can it obtain
judicial review from such a ruling? What happens if a group seeks
Absent such an interpretation, [it has been found,] matters which the Board identified as requiring
clarification but over which the Board lacks jurisdiction, would simply languish, with no apparent
possibility of correction within the Department.” In re Federal Acknowledgement of the
Ramapough Mountain Indians, Inc., 31 I.B.I.A. 61 (1997). Interested parties and the petitioning
group have thirty days after notification of the Board’s decision to submit comments to the
Secretary. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(f)(4). The Secretary has sixty days after receipt of all comments to
determine whether to ask the Assistant Secretary to reconsider the decision. Id. § 83.11(f)(5).
89. 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(f)(2) (2004).
90. Id. § 83.11(h)(2).
91. Id. §83.11(g)(1), (h)(3). The same time frame (120 days) governs a remand from the
Board. Id. § 83.11(g)(1).
92. ASSISTANT SEC’Y – INDIAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF FED. ACKNOWLEDGMENT, SUMMARY STATUS OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT CASES (July 1, 2004).
93. Id.
94. Id. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.11(a)(1) (“Upon publication of the Assistant Secretary’s
determination in the Federal Register, the petitioner or any interested party may file a request for
reconsideration with the Interior Board of Indian Appeals.”).
95. 25 C.F.R. §83.12(a) (2004). Since only Congress can abrogate a treaty, United States v.
Washington, 641 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1981), a tribe’s failure to be recognized administratively
does not affect its vested treaty rights. See Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1203
(10th Cir. 2002); Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1995); cf. W. Shoshone Bus.
Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that an unrecognized tribe had no
standing to obtain statutory benefits under 25 U.S.C. § 81). See generally Weatherhead, supra note
13, at 30-40 (discussing definition of tribe involving treaty rights).
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judicial recognition without first obtaining an administrative decision
from the Assistant Secretary? Can the court consider such a request, or
must the group first exhaust its administrative remedies? If the
exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine does not apply, should a
court nonetheless stay the action pending administrative resolution of the
tribal recognition question under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction?
During the past twenty-five years, DOI’s acknowledgement
regulations have been the subject of frequent litigation. The answers to
the questions presented above, and others concerning the validity, scope,
and application of the 1978 regulations, are addressed below.
A. The Validity of the Regulations
The first important consideration when reviewing the case law
relating to the regulations is that courts uniformly have recognized that
the regulations are the product of a lawful delegation of congressional
authority.96 But, as written, do the regulations exceed the Secretary’s
authority? This was the question presented in Miami Nation of Indians
of Indiana, Inc. v. Babbitt.97
In Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc., the Miami Nation of
Indians of Indiana (“the Miamis”) brought suit against the Secretary of
the Interior and others after it was denied acknowledgment as an Indian
tribe under the regulations.98 As part of their challenge, the Miamis
96. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 255 F.3d
342, 346 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002) (rejecting contention that regulations
are not authorized by Congress); United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F. 3d 543,
549 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The BIA has been delegated the authority to determine whether recognized
status should be accorded to previously unrecognized tribes.”); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of
Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The BIA has the authority to prescribe
regulations for carrying into effect any act relating to Indian affairs.”); James v. United States Dept.
of Health and Human Serv., 824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Congress has specifically
authorized the Executive Branch to prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations.
Regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition of Indian tribes certainly come within
the area of Indian affairs and relations.”); Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v.
Norton, 217 F.Supp. 2d 76, 77 (D.D.C. 2002) (“Pursuant to . . . [congressional] delegation of
authority to the DOI, BIA promulgated regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition
of Indian groups as Indian tribes.”).
97. 887 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
98. Id. at 1162. This litigation proceeded in stages. First, the court ruled that the statute of
limitations barred the claim that the Secretary of the Interior’s decision withdrawing
acknowledgement of the Miamis based on an 1897 decision by the Assistant Attorney General was
ultra vires. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. Lujan, 832 F. Supp. 253, 253 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
Next, the court ruled that the 1978 regulations under which the Miamis were denied
acknowledgement were lawful. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. Babbitt, 887 F. Supp. 1158,
1177 (N.D. Ind. 1995). Lastly, the court ruled that the Department had not acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by declining to acknowledge the Miamis as an Indian tribe. Miami Nation of Indians
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argued that the regulations were invalid because the requirements they
imposed were more burdensome than those which previously existed,99
and because they did not employ a tribal abandonment standard under
which a tribe could prove lineal descent from the treaty tribe and
continuous tribal organization.100 The Miamis further maintained that
the regulations were deficient because they violated the Administrative
Procedures Act (“APA”) by failing to explain policy issues and choices
made in connection with their promulgation.101 Lastly, the Miamis
argued that the Secretary acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
promulgating the regulations102 and that the regulations did not meet
The court rejected all of these
constitutional requirements.103
contentions.
The court initially ruled that because the regulations were
promulgated pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority,104 they
were entitled to deference under Chevron.105 The court then found that
of Ind., Inc. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 742, 763 (N.D. Ind. 2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002).
99. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1168. The Miamis argued that it
was Congress’ intent to recognize all tribes and that the regulations frustrated that intent because
“(1) the criteria became mandatory, rather than permissive; (2) the burden of proof was increased so
that Indian tribes must provide proof from the time of first white contact of a group’s Indian
identity; and (3) the community requirement was increased dramatically.” Id. at 1168.
100. Id. at 1169.
101. Id. at 1170.
102. Id. at 1171. Under the APA, a court’s review of regulations promulgated under 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 (2004) is limited to whether the regulations are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2004). The Miamis argued
that the regulations were arbitrary and capricious since they:
(1) change[d] the criteria that were previously used to recognize tribes without
explaining the change into policy; (2) d[id] not provide [them] or decisionmakers with
sufficient guidance in preparing or reviewing petitions because they d[id] not define key
terms or specify a burden of proof; and (3) d[id] not provide for a formal hearing
including the opportunity to cross-examine the government’s experts or for an
independent review of the government’s final determination.
887 F. Supp. at 1171.
103. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1174. The Miamis maintained that
the regulations did not afford them procedural or substantive due process and also violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Id.
104. Id. at 1165. The court found that the 1978 regulations had been promulgated under the
authority of 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 25. Id. See James v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Serv.,
824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Congress has specifically authorized the Executive Branch
to prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations. Regulations establishing
procedures for federal recognition of Indian tribes certainly come within the area of Indian affairs
and relations.”).
105. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1165. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the Supreme Court ruled:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . .
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the regulations reflected a reasonable interpretation of the statutory
delegation of authority to the Secretary106 and that their failure to
explicitly include a voluntary abandonment standard for previously
recognized Indian tribes did not render them invalid.107 As to the
Miamis’ contention that the regulations were deficient because they
failed to explain policy issues and choices, the court ruled that this
contention was barred by the six-year statute of limitations governing
such challenges.108 Lastly, the court determined that the regulations did
not represent an unannounced change in policy, and that the lack of a
formal hearing in connection with the final acknowledgement
determination, as well as a few vague terms and an unclear burden of
proof, did not render them arbitrary and capricious.109 The court also
ruled that the regulations did not create a legitimate claim of entitlement
that would trigger procedural protection under the due process clause,110
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any
gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a gap for
the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit. In such cases, a court may not substitute its own
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation by the administrator
of an agency.
Id. at 843-44 (quotations and citations omitted).
106. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1168-69. The court found that
“Congress ha[d] not manifested an unambiguous intent to recognize all Indian tribes.” Id. at 1169.
Insofar as the regulations differing from past practices was concerned, given the deference owed the
agency under Chevron, the court determined that such differences were insufficient to render the
Secretary’s action impermissible. Id.
107. Id. at 1169-70. The court reasoned that “if the regulations establish[ed] a permissible
method for determining that a group continues to exist as an Indian tribe, then the regulations must
also implicitly establish a method for determining whether the tribe has been abandoned.” Id. at
1169. But even if the regulations foreclosed the presumption of continued tribal existence, the tribal
acknowledgement standard found no support in any statutory authority, it was a court-made
doctrine, and the Secretary’s ultimate decision after a very active comment period was not
unreasonable. Id. at 1169-70.
108. Id. at 1170-71.
109. Id. at 1171-73. The court found that all of the criteria in the regulations about which the
Miamis complained “appeared in various prior acknowledgment decisions made by the
Department.” Id. at 1172. Furthermore, because the APA did not mandate a hearing and Congress
had not expressed any intent to provide for such, the absence of a hearing in the regulations did not
render them arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1173.
110. Id. at 1175. The court reasoned that when applying the acknowledgement criteria under
the regulations, the Assistant Secretary has “discretion both to view evidence from various sources
and to initiate supplementary research.” Id. The court went on to note that “[a]lthough the
Assistant Secretary has no discretion to refuse federal recognition once he has determined that the
[section] 83.7 criteria have been met, the Assistant Secretary nonetheless is vested with discretion to
determine whether those criteria have been met.” Id. In Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir.
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that they did not violate substantive due process since they were not
arbitrary and capricious,111 and that they were rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose, comporting with equal protection.112
This ruling was affirmed on appeal.113
B. Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
When faced with requests for judicial recognition of tribal status,
depending on the context in which the issue is presented, courts
routinely have invoked the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and
exhaustion of administrative remedies to stay or dismiss actions.114
Primary jurisdiction is a “prudential doctrine under which courts may,
under appropriate circumstances, determine that the initial
decisionmaking responsibility should be performed by the relevant
agency rather than the courts.”115 It “comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a
regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body[.]”116
1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the district court in
Greene v. Lujan, No. C89-645Z, 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 21737 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 1992) had not
erred in ordering a formal adjudication under the provisions of the APA for a tribe which had sought
and been denied recognition. Greene v. Babbitt, 64 F.3d at 1274-75. The regulations in force in
that case, however, had not yet been amended to grant the Interior Board of Indian Appeals the
authority to order hearings before an administrative law judge if genuine issues of material fact
needed resolution in connection with the petition. Id. at 1275. In litigation that ensued following
the formal adjudication, the district court reinstated findings of the administrative law judge which
had been rejected by the Assistant Secretary after improper contact with one of the parties’ lawyers.
See Greene v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 1278, 1289 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
111. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc., 887 F. Supp. at 1176.
112. Id. at 1177. See United Houma Nation v. Babbitt, No. 96-2095, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10095, at *27 (D.D.C. July 8, 1997) (“Nor is this Court persuaded that the regulations, first
implemented in 1978, exceeded the agency’s authority.”).
113. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 255 F.3d
342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002).
114. Mather, supra note 1, at 1849; Ragsdale, supra note 13, at 328 (“When the courts have
confronted tribal attempts to bypass the administrative process and to secure instead a judicial
declaration of recognition, they have with high predictability invoked either exhaustion or primary
jurisdiction.”) (footnotes omitted).
115. Syntek Semiconductor Co., LTD. v. Microchip Tech., Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir.
2002).
116. United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956); see Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S.
258, 268 (1993) (“[The primary jurisdiction doctrine] is a doctrine specifically applicable to claims
properly cognizable in court that contain some issue within the special competence of an
administrative agency.”); Piney Run Preservation Assoc. v. County Comm’rs of Carroll Cty., 268
F.3d 255, 262 n.7 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The doctrine has been deemed to apply in circumstances in
which federal litigation raises a difficult, technical question that falls within the expertise of a
particular agency.”).
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The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
different.117 It provides that “[w]here relief is available from an
administrative agency, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to pursue that
avenue of redress before proceeding to the courts; and until that recourse
is exhausted, suit is premature and must be dismissed.”118
The seminal case on the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies in the tribal recognition context is James v.
United States Department of Health and Human Services.119 In James,
the Gay Head Tribe sought federal acknowledgement without first going
through the regulatory process, maintaining that they had been
previously recognized in a report prepared by a Presidential Commission
in 1822.120 In affirming the dismissal of the complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the decision surrounding the
recognition of the Gay Head Tribe “should be made in the first instance
by the Department of the Interior since Congress ha[d] specifically
authorized the Executive Branch to prescribe regulations concerning
Indian affairs and relations.”121 The court reasoned that the purpose of
the regulatory scheme would be frustrated if the “Judicial Branch made
initial determinations of whether groups have been recognized
previously or whether conditions for recognition currently exist.”122
Following James, other courts have applied the doctrine in upholding the
dismissal of claims brought by groups seeking or claiming tribal
recognition who bypassed the regulatory framework designed to
establish whether the group should be recognized as an Indian tribe. 123
117. See Syntek Semiconductor Co., LTD., 307 F.3d at 780-81 (“The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction is not equivalent to the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies.”); United
States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191 (D. Conn. 1999) (“Primary jurisdiction is
distinct from, although often confused for, the doctrine of exhaustion.”).
118. Reiter, 507 U.S. at 269; W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. at 63 (“‘Exhaustion’ applies where a
claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone; judicial interference is
withheld until the administrative process has run its course.”).
119. 824 F.2d 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
120. Id. at 1133, 1137.
121. Id. at 1137.
122. Id. In support of this proposition, the court relied on 25 U.S.C. §§ 2, 9 (2004). 824 F.2d
at 1137.
123. See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 550-51 (10th Cir.
2001); W. Shoshone Bus. Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1993); Burt Lake
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 217 F.Supp. 2d 76, 78-79 (D.D.C. 2002). To
exhaust its administrative remedies, a group whose petition is denied may also need to seek review
before the Interior Board of Indian Appeals. See W. Shoshone Bus. Council, 1 F.3d at 1055 n.3
(“[W]e note that Department of the Interior decisions are not final for purposes of [Section] 704
review if they are subject to appeal to a higher authority within the department.”); cf. Connecticut ex
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Illustrative of the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker.124 There, a group
calling themselves the Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians (“Golden
Hill”) brought an action against various individuals and entities under
the Nonintercourse Act125 for possession of, and rents and profits in
connection with, certain lands in Connecticut.126 At the time of the
action, Golden Hill had a petition for recognition pending before the
Bureau of Indian Affairs.127 The district court granted defendants’
motions to dismiss on the grounds that Golden Hill was required to
exhaust the administrative procedures governing tribal recognition prior
to seeking a judicial determination of tribal status under the
Nonintercourse Act.128 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, but on slightly different grounds.129
The court of appeals found that because the BIA lacked the
authority to adjudicate Golden Hill’s land claim--only a court had the
power to do that--the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
did not appear to apply, because it requires that the claim be
“‘cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone.’”130
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, the court reasoned
that the Department’s creation of a structured administrative process
with its uniform criteria “made deference to the primary jurisdiction of
the agency appropriate.”131 The court found that the BIA was “better
rel. Town of N. Stonington v. United States Dept. of the Interior, No. 03-6142, 2004 U.S. App.
LEXIS 10172, at *4 (2d Cir. May 24, 2004) (“[U]ntil the Board’s review is complete, the plaintiffs
neither have suffered nor will suffer harm sufficiently concrete to warrant judicial intervention in
the BIA acknowledgment proceedings.”). Failure to exhaust administrative remedies also will
preclude other forms of relief such as mandamus. See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians, 253 F.3d at
551 n.4; W. Shoshone Bus. Council, 1 F.3d at 1059.
124. 39 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1994).
125. The Nonintercourse Act states:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto,
from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity,
unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution.
25 U.S.C. § 177 (2004). See generally Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 617-18 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981) (discussing history of the Nonintercourse Act).
126. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, 39 F.3d at 54-55.
127. Id. at 55.
128. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 839 F. Supp. 130, 135 (D. Conn.
1993).
129. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, 39 F.3d at 56.
130. Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956)).
131. Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, 39 F.3d at 60. Comparing the judicial
formulation of tribal status under the case law interpreting the Nonintercourse Act with the
Department’s regulatory criteria, the court observed:
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qualified by virtue of its knowledge and experience to determine at the
outset whether Golden Hill [met] the criteria for tribal status,” and that
resolution of that question, given the pendency of Golden Hill’s petition,
would assist the district court in its ultimate disposition of Golden Hill’s
claims under the Nonintercourse Act.132 As a result, the court of appeals
directed that the district court stay its proceedings pending a decision by
the Department on Golden Hill’s recognition petition.133 Following the
teaching of Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians, courts have stayed
actions under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in cases involving a
group claiming Indian tribe status under the Nonintercourse Act, and one
claiming such status as a defense in an action seeking injunctive relief
involving the building of a casino.134
C. Unreasonable Delay
The resolution of a petition for recognition takes years.135 The
APA imposes a nondiscretionary duty on an administrative agency to
pass upon a matter presented to it “within a reasonable time,”136 and
empowers a court to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed.”137 While an action seeking recognition is not the
appropriate vehicle to contest undue delay,138 relief has been sought
The two standards overlap, though their application might not always yield identical
results. A federal agency and a district court are not like two trains, wholly unrelated to
one another, racing down parallel tracks towards the same end. Where a statute confers
jurisdiction over a general subject matter to an agency and that matter is a significant
component of a dispute properly before the court, it is desirable that the agency and the
court go down the same track—although at different times— to attain the statute’s ends
by their coordinated action.
Id. at 59.
132. Id. at 60. The court’s ruling did not address whether deference to the Department would
have been appropriate if Golden Hill had not had a petition pending. Id. (“We need not decide
whether deference would be appropriate if no recognition application were pending, but deferral is
fully warranted here where the plaintiff has already invoked BIA’s authority.”).
133. Id. at 60-61. If, after eighteen months, no administrative ruling had been forthcoming
then, upon defendant’s failure to make a showing as to why the stay should not be dissolved, the
district court would have the authority to adjudicate the merits of the case. Id.
134. See New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-9 (E.D.N.Y. 2003);
United States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191-95 (D. Conn. 1999). In both of these
cases, the groups asserting Indian tribal status had petitions pending before the Department.
135. See Coen, supra note 10, at 494 (“The minimum time for the decision-making process,
from the start of active consideration of a petitioner’s documented petition, is twenty-five months.”)
(emphasis added).
136. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2004).
137. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2004).
138. See Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 217 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79
(D.D.C. 2002) (“A direct suit in federal court seeking recognition . . . is not appropriate relief.”).
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under the APA against the Department on the grounds that the decision
regarding a recognition petition was unreasonably delayed.139 In
assessing the reasonableness of administrative delay, a court must
consider “the complexity of the task at hand, the significance (and
permanence) of the outcome, and the resources available to the
agency.”140 When the agency lacks resources and is allocating such
resources in light of competing considerations, administrative delay,
may not be deemed unreasonable.141
139. See, e.g., Muwekma Tribe v. Babbitt, 133 F. Supp. 2d 30, 33 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding
unreasonable delay in processing of petition and directing BIA to submit proposed schedule for
resolving petition). The Department did not appeal the district court’s order in Muwekma where
plaintiffs alleged they were entitled to expedited review because their tribe had been previously
recognized.
140. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1102 (D.C. Cir.
2003). As noted by the court in Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, “[r]esolution of a claim of
unreasonable delay is ordinarily a complicated and nuanced task requiring consideration of the
particular facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. at 1100. Factors relevant to this inquiry
include:
any statutory timetable or other indication of the speed with which [the Congress]
expects the agency to proceed; the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by the
delay, with particular concern for matters of human health and welfare; and the effect of
expediting delayed action on agency activities of a competing or higher priority.
Id. (internal quotations omitted). See Telecomm. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (discussing factors).
141. Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc., 336 F.3d at 1100-01. In some instances,
schedules governing the processing and evaluation of the petitions of certain groups have been the
result of court-approved or court-ordered deadlines. See Recognition of Indian Tribes: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Senate Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Michael R. Smith,
Director, Office of Tribal Services, U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior). In testimony before the Senate in
2002, one DOI official noted:
Court orders impact other petitioners in the process and preempt the ability of the
Department to manage the acknowledgment program and its resources in a uniform and
equitable basis. They impact: i) the petitioner; ii) interested parties; iii) the general
public; iv) the nature and quality of the review of the petition; v) those petitioners on
active consideration; vi)those petitioners with higher priority on the ready list; and vii)
the ability of the Department to manage the acknowledgment program and its resources.
By requiring the Department to give priority to one petition over another, court orders
have forced us to divert limited resources. Based upon our experience, our adherence to
the Court orders has interrupted, delayed, and adversely impacted the petitioners
currently on active consideration and those who are high on the ready list and entitled to
priority in consideration over petitioners under Court orders.
Court orders also adversely impact interested parties and the petitioners themselves.
The interested parties identified with a specific petition include the states, states
Attorneys General, surrounding towns, and recognized tribes. Certain court orders
require the Department to prioritize petitions and truncate the time-frames in the
regulations for interested parties and petitioners to submit comments on the proposed
finding and to receive technical assistance. Court orders abbreviate the time period for
responding to comments and accelerate the completion of the proposed findings and
final determinations.
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D. Substantive Challenges
The Department’s final determination142 with respect to the
recognition of a group as an Indian tribe is subject to judicial review
under the APA.143 Specifically, under section 706(2)(a), a final decision
may be not be disturbed unless it is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.”144 To
date, courts consistently have affirmed administrative decisions by the
Department declining to recognize petitioning groups as Indian tribes as
being not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or in violation of
law.145
E. Summary of the Evolving Case Law
Litigation involving the acknowledgment regulations over the
course of the past twenty-five years has established certain principles.
First, the regulations are the product of a lawful delegation of
congressional authority146 and, as written, they do not exceed the
Id. See Coen, supra note 10, at 503 (“In recent hearings on the acknowledgment process, Congress
acknowledged its responsibility for the limited funding available to the [OFA (previously BAR)]
and asked extensive questions concerning the recent judicial branch decisions that impacted the
priorities and time periods established in the regulations.”).
142. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 255
F.3d 342, 348-49 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002) (indicating that interpretation
or application of acknowledgment regulations is subject to judicial review under the APA). See
also Toulou Testimony, supra note 2 (“[the Secretary of the Interior’s] determinations are subject to
challenge under the Administrative Procedures Act . . . with regard to whether a group has properly
been denied, or granted, acknowledgment.”).
144. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2004).
145. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 742 (N.D. Ind.
2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002); Ramapough
Mountain Indians v. Norton, No. 00-5464, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27805 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2001),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 817 (2002). On the rulemaking front, the court in United Houma Nation v.
Babbitt, No. 96-2095, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10095, at *33 (D.D.C. July 8, 1997), held that the
“Department’s decision to not initiate a rulemaking to change its regulations based on . . .
amendments [to the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934] [could] not be considered as arbitrary and
capricious or contrary to law.”
146. See Miami Nation of Indians of Ind., Inc. v. United States Dep’t. of the Interior, 255 F.3d
342, 346 (7th Cir. 2001), (rejecting contention that regulations are not authorized by Congress);
United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 549 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The BIA
has been delegated the authority to determine whether recognized status should be accorded to
previously unrecognized tribes.”); Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51,
59 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The BIA has the authority to prescribe regulations for carrying into effect any
act relating to Indian affairs.”); James v. United States Dep’t. of Health and Human Serv., 824 F.2d
1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Congress has specifically authorized the Executive Branch to
prescribe regulations concerning Indian affairs and relations. Regulations establishing procedures
for federal recognition of Indian tribes certainly come within the area of Indian affairs and
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Secretary’s authority.147 Second, when faced with requests for judicial
recognition of tribal status, depending on whether the issue is raised
directly or derivatively, courts will stay or dismiss actions pending a
determination on the recognition question by the Department by
invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,148 or that of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.149 Third, actions alleging unreasonable delay
in the administrative recognition process face the difficult hurdle of
demonstrating that lack of resources and competing considerations are
not the principal reason for delay.150 Finally, groups that have been
denied recognition confront the challenge of demonstrating that the
Department’s decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or in violation of law--a stringent standard to meet.151
V. CONCLUSION
The Department of the Interior’s regulations governing tribal
acknowledgment have been the subject of criticism from several fronts.
In 2001, for example, the Government Accounting Office issued a report
criticizing the federal acknowledgement process’s lack of transparency
and delay.152 Commentators have disparaged the regulations as being
relations.”); Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa v. Norton, 217 F.Supp. 2d 76, 77 (D.D.C.
2002) (“Pursuant to . . . [congressional] delegation of authority to the DOI, BIA promulgated
regulations establishing procedures for federal recognition of Indian groups as Indian tribes.”).
147. Miami Nation of Indians of Ind. v. Babbitt, 887 F. Supp. 1158 (N.D. Ind. 1995); United
Houma Nation v. Babbitt, No. 96-2095, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10095, at *27 (D.D.C. July 8,
1997).
148. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1994);
New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 280 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-9 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v.
43.47 Acres of Land, 45 F. Supp. 2d 187, 191-95 (D. Conn. 1999). In all three cases, petitions for
recognition were pending before the Department at the time of the litigation.
149. See United Tribe of Shawnee Indians v. United States, 253 F.3d 543, 550-51 (10th Cir.
2001); W. Shoshone Business Council v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1052, 1057-58 (10th Cir. 1993); James v.
United States Dept. of Health and Human Services, 824 F.2d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Burt
Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 217 F.Supp. 2d 76, 78-79 (D.D.C. 2002).
150. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc. v. Norton, 336 F.3d 1094, 1100-01 (D.C.
Cir. 2003).
151. See Miami Nation of Indians of Indiana, Inc. v. Babbitt, 112 F. Supp. 2d 742 (N.D. Ind.
2000), aff’d, 255 F.3d 342 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1129 (2002) (affirming decision of
Department refusing to recognize group as a tribe); Ramapough Mountain Indians v. Norton, No.
00-5464, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27805 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 11, 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 817
(2002). See generally Wilkins v. Sec’y of the Interior, 995 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1993) (“Federal
courts must defer to any reasonable interpretation given to the statute by the agency charged with its
administration, as well as to the agency’s interpretations and applications of its regulations and
policies in carrying out its statutory duties, unless plainly erroneous.”) (internal quotation omitted).
152. See GAO Report 02-49, supra note 3, at 10 (“[C]learer guidance is needed on the key
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vague and imprecise,153 creating a “bureaucratic morass,”154 and
producing a “recognition process that is exorbitant and timeconsuming.”155 Some maintain that gaming concerns improperly
influence the recognition process.156 Congress also has conducted
numerous oversight hearings157 and regularly proposed legislation to
remedy perceived deficiencies in the regulatory acknowledgment
process, but such legislation has never passed.158
aspect of the criteria and supporting evidence used in recognition decisions. . . . Second, the process
is also hampered by limited resources, a lack of time frames, and ineffective procedures for
providing information to interested third parties.”).
153. See, e.g., Jack Campisi, Reflections on the Last Quarter Century of Tribal Recognition, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 505, 509 (2003) (“[T]he root of the problem, the cause of the excess, rests
squarely on the vagueness and imprecision of the language of the regulations.”); Paschal, supra note
9, at 227 (“The BIA is using evidence inconsistently and employing vague, unquantified standards
to arrive at unreviewable conclusions.”). But see Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) (testimony of the Honorable Earl E. Devaney, Inspector
General for the Department of the Interior) (“While this process has been harshly criticized for its
lack of transparency, based on our experience, it is, relatively speaking, one of the more transparent
processes in DOI, especially after several recent changes to the program.”).
154. See, e.g., Sockbeson, supra note 20, at 489 (referring to his personal experiences with the
“incredibly time-consuming process” involved in achieving recognition for the Wampanoag Tribe
of Gay Head).
155. Kim, supra note 2, at 913.
156. See, e.g., Alex Fryer, Some Tribes Still See Promises Broken, Dreams Thwarted, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 3, 2004 (“The most strident opposition to a tribe’s petition often comes from
established tribes . . . which worry about threats to revenues generated by their casinos. Those
tribes sometimes flood the BIA with information arguing against recognition for a new tribe.”);
Katherine H. Scott, Tribal Process Called Corrupt; Congressional Panel Hears Claims that Casino
Interests Influence the Process, NORWICH BULLETIN, May 6, 2004, available at
http://www.norwichbulletin.com/news/stories/20040506/localnews/361859.html
(“Connecticut
lawmakers have said the Bureau of Indian Affairs seem to act slower on recognition petitions from
tribes that have no plans to open a casino, while tribes with casino plans and backing from deeppocketed investors are put on a fast track.”); Angie Wagner, Home of Their Ancestors is Left
Unprotected, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR TRIBUNE, June 6, 2004, available at
http://www.startribune.com/viewers/story.php?template=print_a&story=4812586 (last visited June
7, 2004) (reporting how a tribe that has declined to apply for recognition “believe[s] one reason the
process is so slow is because the government assumes tribes just want to open casinos”). But see
Campisi, supra note 153, at 507-08 (“A cursory examination of the list of petitioners illustrates that
the vast majority submitted letters of intent to petition well before the Cabazon case and the passage
of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, as well as the American Indian Policy Review Commission
report that was published in 1976.”) (footnotes omitted); Kim supra note 2, at 904 n.23 (“The recent
backlash against Indian casinos hurts Indian groups that seek acknowledgment; however, Indian
groups have petitioned for recognition long before Indian casinos became popular.”).
157. Kim, supra note 2, at 900 n.7 (“The Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held hearings on
the Federal Acknowledgment process (FAP) in 1978, 1983, 1988, 1989, 1992, and 1995.”).
158. See Rosier Testimony, supra note 30, at 2 (“For the past few years, Congress has
considered legislation almost annually to modify the criteria for groups seeking acknowledgment as
Indian tribes or to remove the process altogether from the Department.”); Myers, supra note 15, at
285 (discussing proposed legislation); Ragsdale, supra note 13, at 341-43 (discussing the proposed
Indian Federal Recognition Procedure Act of 1999 and the possibility of creating an independent
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In September 2002, in response to the GAO Report, the Department
implemented a Strategic Plan to address the deficiencies identified.159
Many of the action items in the plan were completed by May 2004, and
the Department is committed to finishing the remaining tasks.160 At
some point, Congress may change the administrative recognition
process. Until then, review of final administrative decisions regarding
the recognition of Indian groups as tribes will, as with other areas of
administrative law, lie with the courts.

commission with “legislatively established” criteria so closely resembling 25 CFR Part 83 that few
advantages seem likely from the proposed change).
159. See Campisi, supra note 153, at 509-10 (discussing submission of Strategic Plan to
Congress); see Coen supra note 10, at 500 (discussing “plan to make acknowledgment precedents
more accessible and to provide clearer guidelines to the regulations in order to ensure consistency in
the decisions and to improve public understanding of, and public confidence in, the
acknowledgment decisions.”) (footnote omitted).
160. See Rosier Testimony, supra note 30, at 4 (“[T]he Department has completed many of the
action items identified in the strategic plan. We plan to have all remaining tasks . . . completed by
this fall. We do recognize . . . that some tasks will take longer to implement because they may
require congressional action, regulatory amendment, or access to the Internet.”).
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